Intention: knowledge, content, and metaphysics
Texto Completo
embargat.txt
Solicita copia
Al rellenar este formulario estáis solicitando una copia del artículo, depositado en el repositorio institucional (DUGiDocs), a su autor o al autor principal del artículo. Será el mismo autor quien decidirá enviar una copia del documento a quien lo solicite si lo considera oportuno. En todo caso, la Biblioteca de la UdG no interviene en este proceso ya que no está autorizada a facilitar artículos cuando éstos son de acceso restringido.
Compartir
ENG- In the articles that form the core of this thesis, the defense of a central idea regarding practical knowledge and the contents of intention justify the critical revision of certain widespread assumptions in the field of action theory. Although the idea that practical knowledge is non-observational is not new, this work does present original arguments which try to show that the scope of such knowledge extends beyond what is normally accepted. The additional thesis that the content of practical knowledge must be closely linked to the content of intention also serves, in an original way, to justify the conclusion that the content of our intentions, including so-called "pure" intentions, refers to particular acts, the details of which are unknown to the agent. The derivations of this thesis help clarify and evaluate ongoing controversies in contemporary philosophy concerning the metaphysics of intentional action
L'accés als continguts d'aquesta tesi queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/