Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain

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We consider the collective decision problem of a society choosing among three alternatives on a strict preference domain in which one preference ordering over alternatives is not admissible. We propose the family of Sequential Pareto Undominated Rules and characterize one of them as the unique full range, anonymous, tops-only, and strategy-proof voting rule ​
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