DUGiDocsUndominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2021-04-07T07:38:40Z
dc.date.available
2022-10-28T05:46:32Z
dc.date.issued
2021-03-26
dc.identifier.issn
0176-1714
dc.identifier.uri
dc.description.abstract
We consider the collective decision problem of a society choosing among three alternatives on a strict preference domain in which one preference ordering over alternatives is not admissible. We propose the family of Sequential Pareto Undominated Rules and characterize one of them as the unique full range, anonymous, tops-only, and strategy-proof voting rule
dc.format.mimetype
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Springer-Verlag
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Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01330-1
dc.relation.ispartof
© Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, vol. UNDEF, núm. UNDEF
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Articles publicats (D-EC)
dc.rights
Tots els drets reservats
dc.source
Berga, Dolors Moreno, Bernardo Nicolò, Antonio 2021 Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain Social Choice and Welfare UNDEF UNDEF
dc.title
Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.accessRights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.embargo.terms
2022-03-26T00:00:00Z
dc.date.embargoEndDate
info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2022-03-26
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.identifier.idgrec
033277
dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed
dc.identifier.eissn
1432-217X