{ "dc.contributor.author": "Barberà, Salvador" , "dc.contributor.author": "Berga, Dolors" , "dc.contributor.author": "Moreno, Bernardo" , "dc.date.accessioned": "2018-11-22T09:58:50Z" , "dc.date.available": "2018-11-22T09:58:50Z" , "dc.date.issued": "2012-07-01" , "dc.identifier.issn": "0899-8256" , "dc.identifier.uri": "http://hdl.handle.net/10256/15985" , "dc.description.abstract": "A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of definition. For the same reason, different conditions may be equivalent for functions defined on some domains, while not in other cases. Understanding the role of domains is therefore a crucial issue in mechanism design. We illustrate this point by analyzing the role of two conditions, monotonicity and reshuffling invariance, that are always necessary, but not always sufficient for strategy-proofness. We identify domains, that we call intertwined, ensuring the equivalence between these two conditions and that of strategy-proofness for whatever functions are defined on them. We prove that some important domains are intertwined: those of single-peaked preferences, both with public and private goods, and also those arising in simple models of house allocation. We also discuss the relationship between our conditions on functions and domains with others considered in the literature" , "dc.description.sponsorship": "Salvador Barberà gratefully acknowledges support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756, from the Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament dʼUniversitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació through the Distinció per a la Promoció de la Recerca Universitària and grant SGR2009-0419. Dolors Berga acknowledges the support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grants SEJ2007-60671 and ECO2010-16353, of Generalitat de Catalunya, through grants 2010-BE-00608 and SGR2009-0189. She also acknowledges the Research Recognition Programme of the Barcelona GSE. Bernardo Moreno gratefully acknowledges financial support from Junta de Andalucia through grants SEJ4941 and SEJ-5980 and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology through grant ECO2008-03674" , "dc.format.mimetype": "application/pdf" , "dc.language.iso": "eng" , "dc.publisher": "Elsevier" , "dc.relation": "MICINN/PN 2011-2013/ECO2010-16353" , "dc.relation": "AGAUR/2009-2014/2009 SGR-189" , "dc.relation.isformatof": "Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.012" , "dc.relation.ispartof": "© Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75, núm. 2, p. 490-509" , "dc.relation.ispartofseries": "Articles publicats (D-EC)" , "dc.rights": "Tots els drets reservats" , "dc.subject": "Elecció social -- Models matemàtics" , "dc.subject": "Social choice -- Mathematical models" , "dc.title": "Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?" , "dc.type": "info:eu-repo/semantics/article" , "dc.rights.accessRights": "info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess" , "dc.type.version": "info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion" , "dc.identifier.doi": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.012" , "dc.identifier.idgrec": "015309" , "dc.contributor.funder": "Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (Espanya)" , "dc.type.peerreviewed": "peer-reviewed" }