Reliable misrepresentation and teleosemantics
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2014-09-22T06:52:40Z
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2014-09-22T06:52:40Z
dc.date.issued
2013-11
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0873-626X
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dc.description.abstract
Mendelovici (forthcoming) has recently argued that (1) tracking theories of mental representation (including teleosemantics) are incompatible with the possibility of reliable misrepresentation and that (2) this is an important difficulty for them. Furthermore, she argues that this problem commits teleosemantics to an unjustified a priori rejection of color eliminativism. In this paper I argue that (1) teleosemantics can accommodate most cases of reliable misrepresentation, (2) those cases the theory fails to account for are not objectionable and (3) teleosemantics is not committed to any problematic view on the color realism-antirealism debate
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application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
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Universidade de Lisboa
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Reproducció digital del document publicat a: http://www.disputatio.com/
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© Disputatio, 2013, vol. V, núm. 37, p. 265-281
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Articles publicats (D-FS)
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Tots els drets reservats
dc.subject
dc.title
Reliable misrepresentation and teleosemantics
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.embargo.terms
Cap
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info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion