DUGiDocsProving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2013-07-12T08:14:54Z
dc.date.available
2013-07-12T08:14:54Z
dc.date.issued
2012-01
dc.identifier.uri
dc.description.abstract
Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematical analysis to determine if agents can take advantage of dishonest strategies and the use of simulations to study the behaviour of bidders
dc.description.sponsorship
This research project has been partially funded through the projects labeled TIN2008-
04547 and DPI2011-24929, and BR10/18 Scholarship of the University of Girona granted
to Albert Pla
dc.format.mimetype
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Universitat de Girona. Institut d'Informàtica i Aplicacions
dc.relation
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN//DPI2011-24929/ES/I-WMS: METODOS DE SOPORTE A LA DECISION PARA SISTEMAS DE GESTION DE WORKFLOWS FLEXIBLES/
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN//TIN2008-04547/ES/SUBASTAS ROBUSTAS MEDIANTE LA INCORPORACION DE TECNICAS DE SATISFACTIBILIDAD MODULO TEORIAS/
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Informes (IIIA)
dc.rights
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
dc.rights.uri
dc.title
Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/report
dc.rights.accessRights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.relation.ProjectAcronym