DUGiDocsSome Reflections on the Goal-Directed Theory of Emotion
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2025-04-11T06:53:14Z
dc.date.available
2025-04-11T06:53:14Z
dc.date.issued
2025-03-28
dc.identifier.issn
0353-5150
dc.identifier.uri
dc.description.abstract
In this paper, I discuss the goal-directed theory of emotion as advanced and defended by psychologist Agnes Moors. I give some reasons for supporting one of its main tenets, namely, that emotional episodes involve decision-making processes. I will however object that the theory has trouble to account for some aspects of positive emotions and in general to accommodate some instances of extremely positive and extremely negative emotions. I will also argue that, in order to account for the irrationality involved in emotional recalcitrance, some sort of duality of emotional mechanisms is also required
dc.description.sponsorship
Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. Project code: PID2021-127046NA-100
Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature
dc.format.mimetype
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Springer Nature
dc.relation.isformatof
Reproducció digital del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-025-00637-3
dc.relation.ispartof
Acta Analytica, 2025, vol. undef, núm. undef, p. undef
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Articles publicats (D-FS)
dc.rights
Reconeixement 4.0 Internacional
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dc.source
Pineda Oliva, David 2025 Some Reflections on the Goal-Directed Theory of Emotion Acta Analytica undef undef undef
dc.title
Some Reflections on the Goal-Directed Theory of Emotion
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.accessRights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.identifier.idgrec
040336
dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed
dc.identifier.eissn
1874-6349