Testimonial injustice in evidential reasoning: a reply to Federico Picinali

Abstract

This article critiques Federico Picinali’s theoretical framework for explaining how testimo-nial injustice impacts evidential reasoning. It argues that Picinali’s framework, though intended to be general, falls short in capturing various forms of testimonial injustice in the assessments of relevance and probative value. Two reasons are offered to support this conclusion. First, Picinali’s emphasis on the idea of stock of knowledge offers an intricate manifestation of the phenomenon, leaving aside cases of testimonial injustice simpliciter. Second, his framework overlooks instances of credibility excess and how epistemic harms that affect different agents may ricochet to the parties. It is argued that Picinali’s framework can be improved by adopting a description of testimonial injustice in the assessments of relevance and probative value that is less intricate and more relational