DUGiDocsJudging beyond any reasonable doubt: a logic and epistemological rule
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2025-02-13T09:51:02Z
dc.date.available
2025-02-13T09:51:02Z
dc.date.issued
2024
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2660-4515
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dc.description.abstract
The doubt is not related to innocence but only to guilt, the latter being the exclusive object of the process. The proof of guilt, being always of inductive nature, cannot accept the deductive method that connotes the relationship between premise (minor and major) and conclu-sion. From here arises the necessity that beyond reasonable doubt must respond to the postulates of logic and the motivation of judgments is an example. Research tends to show whether there is a valid theory to overcome the doubt of uncertainty about guilt-innocence. Can jurisprudence (mathematics-legal) as an exact science aid in the discovery of a perfect syllogism for a valid theory of reasonable doubt?
dc.format.mimetype
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Universitat de Girona Marcial Pons
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Reproducció digital del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i7.23028
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QF, vol. 07 (2024), p. 43-68
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QF, núm. 07 (2024)
dc.rights
Attribution 4.0 International
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dc.title
Judging beyond any reasonable doubt: a logic and epistemological rule
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.accessRights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed
dc.identifier.eissn
2604-6202
dc.description.ods
16. Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas