A non-causalist account of the explanatory autonomy in the psychological sciences
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2024-10-23T07:51:36Z
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2024-10-23T07:51:37Z
dc.date.issued
2024-08-27
dc.identifier.issn
0039-7857
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dc.description.abstract
It has been often claimed that physicalism challenges the explanatory autonomy of psychological sciences.Most who advocate for such explanatory autonomy and do not want to renounce to physicalism, presuppose a causalist account of explanatoriness and try to demonstrate that, adequately construed, (causal) psychological explanations are compatible with (some sufficient version of) physicalism. In Sect. 1 we summarize the different theses and assumptions involved in the seeming conflict between explanatory autonomy and physicalism. In Sect. 2 we review the main attempts to make them compatible assuming a causalist account of explanation and argue that none succeeds. In Sect. 3 we introduce a recent, non-causalist account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding (ASE) that has been successfully applied to other fields. In Sect. 4 we apply ASE to elucidate two paradigmatic cognitive explanations of psychological phenomena: déjà vu and action production. We conclude that ASE elucidates well the autonomy of the cognitive explanations of these phenomena independently of what finally happens with the causal exclusion problem and that it may be generalized to other psychological explanations
dc.description.sponsorship
This work was supported by Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (Grant Nos. PID2020-115114GB-I00, CEX2021-001169-M, PID2021-127046NA-I00)
Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature
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application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Springer-Verlag
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Reproducció digital del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04657-1
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Synthese, 2024, vol. 204, art.núm.89
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Articles publicats (D-FS)
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Reconeixement 4.0 Internacional
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dc.source
Díez Calzada, José Antonio Pineda Oliva, David 2024 A non-causalist account of the explanatory autonomy in the psychological sciences Synthese 204 art.núm.89
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dc.title
A non-causalist account of the explanatory autonomy in the psychological sciences
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.accessRights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.identifier.idgrec
039239
dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed
dc.identifier.eissn
1573-0964