Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2024-05-17T06:53:44Z
dc.date.available
2024-05-17T06:53:44Z
dc.date.issued
2010-09
dc.identifier.issn
0022-0531
dc.identifier.uri
dc.description.abstract
A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. There are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. We provide conditions on domains guaranteeing that for all rules defined on them, individual and group strategy-proofness become equivalent. We also provide a partial answer regarding the necessity of our conditions
dc.format.mimetype
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Elsevier
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Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.006
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© Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, vol. 145, núm. 5, p. 1648-1674
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Articles publicats (D-EC)
dc.rights
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.uri
dc.title
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.accessRights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.identifier.idgrec
013384
dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed
dc.identifier.eissn
1095-7235