DUGiDocsDuality of welfare and profit maximization
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2024-04-23T11:22:33Z
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2024-04-23T11:22:33Z
dc.date.issued
2011-12
dc.identifier.issn
0165-1765
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dc.description.abstract
Many economists are aware that the conditions for the efficiency and monopolization in a partial equilibrium framework are the extremes of the Ramsey-Boiteux formula when the Lagrange multiplier for the budget varies. We formalize the duality existing between the welfarist and monopolist constrained maximization programs by proving the following 'folk theorem': max Welfare s.t. profit ≥ fixed cost ⇔ max Profit s.t. output ≥ minimum
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Financial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya (Xarxa de referència d′R+D+I en Economia i Polítiques Públiques) and the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (project SEJ2007-60671) are gratefully acknowledged
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3 p.
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application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Elsevier
dc.relation
SEJ2007-60671
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Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.07.010
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© Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 113, núm. 3, p. 215-217
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Articles publicats (D-EC)
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Reconeixement-NoComercial-SenseObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional
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dc.source
Boccard, Nicolas 2011 Duality of welfare and profit maximization Economics Letters 113 3 215 217
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dc.title
Duality of welfare and profit maximization
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.relation.projectID
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MEC//SEJ2007-60671/ES/REGULACION DE MERCADOS Y EL PAPEL DE LOS INCENTIVOS/
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info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.identifier.idgrec
019736
dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed
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dc.identifier.eissn
1873-7374