The Morality of Compensation through Tort Law
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2023-02-10T12:43:28Z
dc.date.available
2023-02-10T12:43:28Z
dc.date.issued
2023-03
dc.identifier.issn
0952-1917
dc.identifier.uri
dc.description.abstract
In this paper, I will focus on the normative structure of tort law. Only by elucidating the point or rationale of holding the wrongdoer responsible to the victim can we understand the value of having tort law instead of establishing other mechanisms of redress, such as a social insurance scheme. Ultimately, I will argue that the value of interpersonal justice, which underlies tort law, might not suffice to fully justify it in a given community. It all depends on whether victims of accidents are able to vindicate their rights against wrongdoers on a regular basis. If social conditions make this unlikely, then the state might be morally required to implement other forms of compensation, either replacing tort law altogether or supplementing it with social insurance in cases where private justice mechanisms tend to fail more dramatically
dc.description.sponsorship
Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Wiley
dc.format.mimetype
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Wiley
dc.relation.isformatof
Reproducció digital del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12369
dc.relation.ispartof
Ratio Juris: An international journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, 2023, vol. 36, núm. 1, p. 3-25
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Articles publicats (D-DP)
dc.rights
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.uri
dc.title
The Morality of Compensation through Tort Law
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.accessRights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed
dc.identifier.eissn
1467-9337