Public policy design and common property resources: A social network approach
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2023-02-10T12:32:45Z
dc.date.available
2023-02-10T12:32:45Z
dc.date.issued
2024-01-01
dc.identifier.issn
0002-9092
dc.identifier.uri
dc.description.abstract
This paper analyzes the extent to which two factors—social networks and the severity of the scarcity of a common property resource—affect norm-complying behavior that favors cooperation. It assumes that those who comply with the social norm exercise social pressure on defectors. We develop an analytical framework that allows us to determine the minimum (maximum) share of norm-complying agents at which social networks start (stop) having an influence on cooperation. Knowing these shares allows policymakers to identify the conditions under which legal and/or informal enforcement policies for cooperation are effective and how different types of social networks affect the design of these policies. We find that stable steady states exist in which compliers and defectors coexist (partial cooperation), but the stability of such states requires that the costs of coordination among compliers to exercise social pressure are high. Full cooperation is another possible steady state but is unlikely to prevail if the agents do not perceive the scarcity of the common property resource as severe. A numerical study, empirically calibrated for an aquifer in Spain, shows that subsidizing the compliers' costs of exerting social pressure may impede the attainment of a steady state based on partial cooperation. Although social networks can promote cooperation, their influence is limited. The minimum share of compliers for attaining cooperation can be reduced by informal enforcement policies by not more than 26%. We show that combinations of different types of informal enforcement policies should be applied cautiously because they may cancel each other out
dc.description.sponsorship
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (MCIN)/Agencia Española de Investigación(AEI). Grant Number: PID2020-118268RB; SDGnexus Network. Grant Number: 57526248 and German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation (BMZ)
Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Wiley
dc.format.mimetype
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Wiley
dc.relation
PID2020-118268RB-I00
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Reproducció digital del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12372
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American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2024, vol. 106, núm. 1, p. 252-285
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Articles publicats (D-EC)
dc.rights
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.uri
dc.subject
dc.title
Public policy design and common property resources: A social network approach
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.accessRights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.relation.projectID
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2020-118268RB-I00/ES/COORDINACION DE POLITICAS, INTERACCION SOCIAL Y GESTION DE LOS RECURSOS NATURALES /
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.contributor.funder
dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed
dc.relation.FundingProgramme
dc.relation.ProjectAcronym
dc.identifier.eissn
1467-8276
dc.description.ods
8. Trabajo decente y crecimiento económico
12. Producción y consumo responsables