DUGiDocsPreference Reversal and Group Strategy-Proofness
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2021-03-24T12:08:38Z
dc.date.available
2023-05-23T09:50:07Z
dc.date.issued
2020-11-01
dc.identifier.issn
0165-1765
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dc.description.abstract
We study the problem of choosing one alternative given agent's strict preferences. We show that preference reversal (Eliaz, 2004) implies group strategy-proofness. Moreover, they are equivalent for the special cases where only two or three alternatives may be chosen
dc.description.sponsorship
We also appreciate comments of S. Barber‡ and A. NicolÚ. D. Berga acknowledges
the support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness through grant ECO2016-76255-P. B. Moreno thanks the support from
Junta de AndalucÌa through grant UMA18-FEDERJA-130. Both authors thank
the MOMA network
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application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Elsevier
dc.relation
MINECO/PE 2016-2018/ECO2016-76255-P
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Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109493
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© Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 196, art.núm.109493
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Articles publicats (D-EC)
dc.rights
Reconeixement-NoComercial-SenseObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional
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dc.source
Berga, Dolors Moreno, Bernardo 2020 Preference Reversal and Group Strategy-Proofness Economics Letters 196 art.núm.109493
dc.subject
dc.title
Preference Reversal and Group Strategy-Proofness
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.accessRights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.embargo.terms
2022-11-01T00:00:00Z
dc.date.embargoEndDate
info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2022-11-01
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.identifier.idgrec
033276
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dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed
dc.identifier.eissn
1873-7374