DUGiDocsCondorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2021-03-24T11:51:21Z
dc.date.available
2022-10-28T05:46:32Z
dc.date.issued
2019-08
dc.identifier.issn
0165-1765
dc.identifier.uri
dc.description.abstract
We study voting problems with an odd number of agents and single-peaked preferences. With only three alternatives, there are scoring rules that yield the Condorcet winner only for committees of three and five agents. With four or more alternatives, only committees of three agents work. In all these scoring rules, the best and worst alternatives are assigned a score of 1 and 0, respectively, and any middle alternative a score between 0 and 1 2 . For five or more alternatives, the score of any middle alternative must be the same, and we call this family semiplurality scoring rules
dc.description.sponsorship
nts. D. Berga acknowledges
the support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness through grant ECO2016-76255-P. G. Correa-Lopera and B. Moreno thank
the support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness through grant ECO2017-86245-P. All authors thank the MOMA ne
dc.format.extent
4 p.
dc.format.mimetype
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Elsevier
dc.relation
MINECO/PE 2016-2018/ECO2016-76255-P
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Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.028
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© Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 181, p. 199-202
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Articles publicats (D-EC)
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Tots els drets reservats
dc.source
Berga, Dolors Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe Moreno, Bernardo 2019 Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness Economics Letters 181 199 202
dc.title
Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.accessRights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.embargo.terms
2021-08-31T00:00:00Z
dc.date.embargoEndDate
info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2021-08-31
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.identifier.idgrec
033274
dc.contributor.funder
dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed
dc.identifier.eissn
1873-7374