DUGiDocsIn Defense of Weird Hypotheticals
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2021-03-05T07:37:54Z
dc.date.available
2021-03-05T07:37:54Z
dc.date.issued
2021-01-20
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2660-4515
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dc.description.abstract
Professor Allen (this issue) critiques the value of using “weird” hypotheticals to mine
intuitions about legal systems. I respond by supporting the value of “thin” hypotheticals for providing information about how people reason generally, rather than for revealing peoples’ specific
answers. I note that because legal systems are the products of many minds thinking about how
other minds operate, the object of inquiry is metacognition—that is, understanding how reasoning works
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application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Universitat de Girona. Càtedra de Cultura Jurídica
Marcial Pons
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Reproducció digital del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i2.22477
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Quaestio facti: revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio, 2021, núm.2, p. 325-338
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QF, vol. 02 (2021)
dc.rights
Reconeixement 4.0 Internacional
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dc.title
In Defense of Weird Hypotheticals
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed
dc.identifier.eissn
2604-6202