Strong, Weak, or Apparent Naturalization? Relative Plausibility Theory and Conceptual Analysis
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2021-03-05T07:34:16Z
dc.date.available
2021-03-05T07:34:16Z
dc.date.issued
2021-01-28
dc.identifier.issn
2660-4515
dc.identifier.uri
dc.description.abstract
This article focuses on the adoption of naturalized epistemology as a framework for the relative plausibility theory developed by Ron Allen. It questions both the distinctness of Allen’s way of theorizing from a common version of conceptual analysis and the compliance of relative plausibility theory with the “naturalistic” methodological requirement expressed by the “Results Continuity” thesis
dc.format.mimetype
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Universitat de Girona. Càtedra de Cultura Jurídica
Marcial Pons
dc.relation.isformatof
Reproducció digital del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i2.22465
dc.relation.ispartof
Quaestio facti: revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio, 2021, núm.2, p. 313-324
dc.relation.ispartofseries
QF, vol. 02 (2021)
dc.rights
Reconeixement 4.0 Internacional
dc.rights.uri
dc.title
Strong, Weak, or Apparent Naturalization? Relative Plausibility Theory and Conceptual Analysis
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.accessRights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed
dc.identifier.eissn
2604-6202