Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence: Methodological Reflections
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2021-03-05T07:27:29Z
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2021-03-05T07:27:29Z
dc.date.issued
2021-01-01
dc.identifier.issn
2660-4515
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dc.description.abstract
This paper discusses Ronald Allen’s article, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited, and reflects on how epistemology can contribute to our understanding of the evidentiary proof process. I first situate Allen’s critique of recent philosophical scholarship, distinguishing between general theoretical accounts of proof (including the theory that Allen and I have defended), on one hand, and the applications of specific epistemological concepts or issues to law, on the other. I then present a methodological picture that diverges in some respects from the one that emerges from Allen’s critique. In discussing this alternative methodological picture, I explain how epistemology can contribute to legal evidence and proof while avoiding the problems that Allen identifies
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application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Universitat de Girona. Càtedra de Cultura Jurídica
Marcial Pons
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Reproducció digital del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i2.22446
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Quaestio facti: revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio, 2021, núm.2, p. 253-284
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QF, vol. 02 (2021)
dc.rights
Reconeixement 4.0 Internacional
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dc.title
Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence: Methodological Reflections
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.accessRights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed
dc.identifier.eissn
2604-6202