La decisión sobre la quaestio facti en los acuerdos de culpabilidad
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The author challenges a doctrine that, to some extent, has been well accepted in the
science of criminal procedure. According to such doctrine, the plea bargain and other mechanisms
implemented to avoid trial embrace a concept of truth that is different from the concept upheld
by correspondence theories. As opposed to such doctrine, the author reaffirms the validity and
importance of a correspondence concept of truth in the context of the mechanisms to avoid trial.
The author then suggests that there are moral reasons —not derived from the general interest in
seeking the truth— that would require a prosecutor willing to propose a plea deal to have the
same amount of evidence that would be necessary to move forward with a regular trial. The author
ultimately envisage the consequences of applying the proposed standard, along with other specific
characteristics of these proceedings, towards the enhancement of the epistemic conditions, under
which we decide about facts in trial avoiding contexts