DUGiDocsAssessment Sensitivity in Legal Discourse
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dc.date.accessioned
2020-11-30T14:19:25Z
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2020-11-30T14:19:25Z
dc.date.issued
2018
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0020-174X
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dc.description.abstract
We explain three phenomena in legal discourse in terms of MacFarlane's assessment-sensitive semantics: incompatible applications of law, assessments of statements about what is legally the case, and retrospective overruling. The claim is that assessment sensitivity fits in with the view, shared by many legal theorists at least with respect to hard cases, that the final adjudicator's interpretation of legal sources is constitutive of the applied norm. We argue that there are strong analogies between certain kinds of statements in legal discourse as understood in light of that view and discourse about matters of taste and future contingents. Thus, if assessment-sensitive semantics provides a compelling account of discourse about matters of taste and future contingents, then it likewise provides a compelling account of those statements in legal discourse
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application/pdf
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eng
dc.publisher
Taylor and Francis
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Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1371874
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Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2017, vol. 61, núm. 4
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Articles publicats (D-DP)
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Tots els drets reservats
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Kristan, Andrej Vignolo, Massimiliano 2017 Assessment Sensitivity in Legal Discourse Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 4
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dc.title
Assessment Sensitivity in Legal Discourse
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.identifier.idgrec
026196
dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed
dc.identifier.eissn
1502-3923