Expresivismo metajurídico, enunciados internos y aceptación plural: una exploración crítica
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One of the most profoundly debated issues in recent legal philosophy has been that of
the ways in which to account for the phenomenon of disagreement among legal practitioners
and among jurists when it comes to elucidating the content of the law and to,
therefore, finding legal answers to particular controversies. Deriving from Ronald
Dworkin’s work, this issue has become the instrument for an intense critical re-examination
of legal positivism and has consequently spurred several jurisprudential
approaches trying to account for the phenomenon in a way consistent with the central
positivistic tenets. One of those approaches, in particular, intends to face the challenge
by linking legal positivism to an expressivist analysis of first order legal discourse;
an analysis analogous to that proposed for moral discourse by important authors in
contemporary metaethics. In this paper I introduce the main features of this jurisprudential
approach, inquiring into both some of its virtues and of its major difficulties
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