DUGiDocsOn two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2018-03-13T14:27:11Z
dc.date.available
2018-03-13T14:27:11Z
dc.date.issued
2008
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1545-2921
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dc.description.abstract
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership. Thus, they must take into account, when voting, the effect of their votes not only on the chosen alternative but also on the final composition of the society. We show that, under plausible restrictions on preferences, equilibria of this two-stage game satisfy stability and voter's sovereignty
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application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
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Economics Bulletin
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Reproducció digital del document publicat a: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2008/Volume4/EB-08D70024A.pdf
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© Economics bulletin, 2008, vol. 4, núm. 21, p. 1-29
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Articles publicats (D-EC)
dc.rights
Tots els drets reservats
dc.title
On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.identifier.idgrec
008198
dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed