DUGiDocsAn undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2018-03-13T09:10:54Z
dc.date.available
2018-03-13T09:10:54Z
dc.date.issued
2007-09-01
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0165-4896
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dc.description.abstract
We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide to either stay or exit the society. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the elected candidates, but also on the final composition of the society. For additive and monotonic preferences with dichotomous bads we construct a strategy profile that is an undominated pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced voting game
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application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Elsevier
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Versió preprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.03.004
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© Mathematical social sciences, 2007, vol. 54, núm. 2, p. 152-175
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Articles publicats (D-EC)
dc.rights
Tots els drets reservats
dc.subject
dc.title
An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.identifier.idgrec
008195
dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed