DUGiDocsStability and voting by committees with exit
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2018-03-13T08:41:08Z
dc.date.available
2018-03-13T08:41:08Z
dc.date.issued
2004-10-01
dc.identifier.issn
0176-1714
dc.identifier.uri
dc.description.abstract
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà et al. 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder's sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society
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application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Springer Verlag
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Versió preprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6
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© Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, vol. 23, núm. 2, p. 229-247
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Articles publicats (D-EC)
dc.rights
Tots els drets reservats
dc.title
Stability and voting by committees with exit
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.accessRights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.identifier.idgrec
003484
dc.type.peerreviewed
peer-reviewed
dc.identifier.eissn
1432-217X