DUGiDocsCreença i realitat en William James
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2016-03-07T08:43:20Z
dc.date.available
2016-03-07T08:43:20Z
dc.date.issued
2008
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2341-1414
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dc.description.abstract
This paper is devoted to analyse both the epistemology and ontology of James’s pragmatism and his metaphysical proposals. The conclusions are: first, that James did not defend a metaphysical realism, but a antirealist realism; and secondly that this position was what he needed to defend the possibility of human freedom and religious experience
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application/pdf
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cat
dc.publisher
Societat de Filosofia del País Valencià
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Reproducció digital del document publicat a: http://roderic.uv.es/handle/10550/43118
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Quaderns de filosofia i ciència, 2008, núm. 38, p. 23-30
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Articles publicats (D-FS)
dc.rights
Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Spain
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dc.subject
dc.title
Creença i realitat en William James
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.embargo.terms
Cap
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info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.identifier.idgrec
024800
dc.identifier.eissn
0213-5965