DUGiDocsA maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2015-12-10T08:03:23Z
dc.date.available
2015-12-10T08:03:23Z
dc.date.issued
2014
dc.identifier.issn
0020-7276
0020-7276
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dc.description.abstract
Following "Barberà et al. (1991, Econometrica 59:595-609)", we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategy-proofness and no-vetoer
dc.description.sponsorship
We would like to thank Professors Barbera, Masso, Neme, and Sonnenschein for helpful discussions. We are also grateful to an associate editor, two anonymous reviewers, and participants at the 10th International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare in Moscow, the 1st MOVE-ISER joint workshop at Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, and a seminar at Kyoto University for helpful comments. Hatsumi and Serizawa acknowledge support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science through the Research Fellowship for Young Scientists 22-4996 and the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research 22330061, respectively. Berga acknowledges the support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through the grants SEJ2007-60671 and ECO2010-16353, and from Generalitat de Catalunya through the grant SGR2009-0189. She also acknowledges the Research Recognition Programme of the Barcelona GSE
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application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Springer Verlag
dc.relation
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN//ECO2010-16353/ES/BIENESTAR SOCIAL Y REGULACION DE MERCADOS/
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MEC//SEJ2007-60671/ES/REGULACION DE MERCADOS Y EL PAPEL DE LOS INCENTIVOS/
AGAUR/2009-2014/2009 SGR-189
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Reproducció digital del document publicat a: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0378-6
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© International Journal of Game Theory, 2014, vol. 43, núm. 1, p. 153-168
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Articles publicats (D-EC)
dc.rights
Tots els drets reservats
dc.title
A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.accessRights
info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.embargo.terms
Cap
dc.date.embargoEndDate
info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2026-01-01
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.identifier.idgrec
008199
dc.contributor.funder
dc.relation.ProjectAcronym
dc.identifier.eissn
1432-1270