A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model

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Following "Barberà et al. (1991, Econometrica 59:595-609)", we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategy-proofness and no-vetoer ​
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