DUGiDocsEndorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2015-07-21T09:15:23Z
dc.date.available
2015-07-21T09:15:23Z
dc.date.issued
2007
dc.identifier.issn
0495-4548
dc.identifier.uri
dc.description.abstract
Moran’s conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge
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application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Universidad del País Vasco
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Reproducció digital del document publicat a: http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.479
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THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2007, vol. 22, núm. 58, p. 25-33
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Articles publicats (D-FS)
dc.rights
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
dc.rights.uri
dc.subject
dc.title
Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.accessRights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.embargo.terms
Cap
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.identifier.idgrec
007875
dc.identifier.eissn
2171-679X