http://hdl.handle.net/10256/7780 Wed, 22 May 2019 22:18:32 GMT 2019-05-22T22:18:32Z http://hdl.handle.net/10256/8026 Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions Pla Planas, Albert; López Ibáñez, Beatriz; Murillo Espinar, Javier Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematical analysis to determine if agents can take advantage of dishonest strategies and the use of simulations to study the behaviour of bidders Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10256/8026 2012-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10256/7781 Comparison of Work Scheduling Using Constraint Programming or Auctions Torrent-Fontbona, Ferran; López Ibáñez, Beatriz Business processes designers take into account the resources that the processes would need, but, due to the variable cost of certain parameters (like energy) or other circumstances, this scheduling must be done when business process enactment. In this report we formalize the energy aware resource cost, including time and usage dependent rates. We also present a constraint programming approach and an auction-based approach to solve the mentioned problem including a comparison of them and a comparison of the proposed algorithms for solving them Fri, 01 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10256/7781 2013-03-01T00:00:00Z