Informes (IIIA)http://hdl.handle.net/10256/77802025-08-25T15:39:57Z2025-08-25T15:39:57ZProving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute AuctionsPla Planas, AlbertLópez Ibáñez, BeatrizMurillo Espinar, Javierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10256/80262024-05-13T11:56:03Z2012-01-01T00:00:00ZProving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions
Pla Planas, Albert; López Ibáñez, Beatriz; Murillo Espinar, Javier
Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematical analysis to determine if agents can take advantage of dishonest strategies and the use of simulations to study the behaviour of bidders
2012-01-01T00:00:00ZComparison of Work Scheduling Using Constraint Programming or AuctionsTorrent-Fontbona, FerranLópez Ibáñez, Beatrizhttp://hdl.handle.net/10256/77812024-05-13T11:55:39Z2013-03-01T00:00:00ZComparison of Work Scheduling Using Constraint Programming or Auctions
Torrent-Fontbona, Ferran; López Ibáñez, Beatriz
Business processes designers take into account the resources that the processes would need, but, due to the variable cost of certain parameters (like energy) or other circumstances, this scheduling must be done when business process enactment. In this report we formalize the energy aware resource cost, including time and usage dependent rates. We also present a constraint programming approach and an auction-based approach to solve the mentioned problem including a comparison of them and a comparison of the proposed algorithms for solving them
2013-03-01T00:00:00Z