Effects of punishment in a mobile population playing the prisoner’s dilemma game
dc.contributor.author
dc.date.accessioned
2013-03-19T15:29:59Z
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2013-03-19T15:29:59Z
dc.date.issued
2011
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1539-3755
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dc.description.abstract
We deal with a system of prisoner’s dilemma players undergoing continuous motion in a two-dimensional plane. In contrast to previous work, we introduce altruistic punishment after the game. We find punishing only a few of the cooperator-defector interactions is enough to lead the system to a cooperative state in environments where otherwise defection would take over the population. This happens even with soft nonsocial punishment (where both cooperators and defectors punish other players, a behavior observed in many human populations). For high enough mobilities or temptations to defect, low rates of social punishment can no longer avoid the breakdown of cooperation
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application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
American Physical Society
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Reproducció digital del document publicat a: http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.84.066115
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© Physical Review E, 2011, vol. 84, núm. 6, p. 066115
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Articles publicats (D-F)
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Tots els drets reservats
dc.title
Effects of punishment in a mobile population playing the prisoner’s dilemma game
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.embargo.terms
Cap
dc.type.version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.identifier.doi
dc.identifier.idgrec
015279
dc.identifier.eissn
1550-2376