



# **Improving Social Understanding of Preschool Children: Evaluation of a Training Program**

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## Abstract

**Introduction.** This study tested the effects of a training program intending to foster social understanding or the capacity which enables them to understand themselves and others in terms of intentions, beliefs, desires, and emotions in children at preschool age. A number of studies have shown that in the context of shared narratives, children are particularly likely to engage in talk about inner states.

**Method.** Participants were 96 Spanish children aged between 39 and 52 months ( $M = 45.63$ ;  $SD = 3.79$ ) from two schools. Two classes formed the intervention group, who listened to the story, and the other two formed the control group, where no intervention was made. In both cases, three social understanding tests were administered before and after the training by their kindergarten teachers.

**Results.** The results obtained by the Mann–Whitney  $U$  non-parametric test show that only the children from the intervention group improved significantly their social understanding.

**Discussion and Conclusion.** This study indicates that it is possible to improve social understanding skills of preschool children by a picture-book reading training program. That is, a special way to explain stories could foster socio-emotional outcomes.

**Keywords:** social understanding, theory of mind, preschool, action-based approach, shared narratives, proximal development zone.

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# Mejora de la comprensión social de niños preescolares: evaluación de un programa de formación

## Resumen

**Introducción.** En este trabajo examinamos los efectos de un programa educativo dirigido a niños y niñas en edad preescolar que tiene el objetivo de mejorar la comprensión social, es decir, la capacidad para entender la conducta de las personas en base a intenciones, creencias, deseos y emociones. Distintos estudios muestran que en el contexto de narrativas compartidas, las criaturas están implicadas en discursos mentalistas.

**Método.** Participaron 96 niños y niñas, de dos escuelas distintas, de edades comprendidas entre los 39 y los 52 meses ( $M = 45.63$ ;  $DS = 3.79$ ). Dos clases formaron el grupo de intervención, escucharon una historia, y otros dos el grupo control, sin ninguna intervención educativa. En ambos casos, se administraron tres pruebas de comprensión social antes y después de participar en el entrenamiento por parte de los maestros y maestras.

**Resultados.** Los resultados obtenidos a través de la prueba no paramétrica U de Mann Whitney permiten afirmar que solamente en los niños y niñas del grupo que participaron en la sesión de entrenamiento o intervención educativa mejoraron significativamente sus puntuaciones en comprensión social.

**Discusión y Conclusión.** El estudio indica que es posible mejorar habilidades en comprensión social en niños y niñas de preescolar a través de un programa educativo de lectura de cuentos. Es decir, mediante un modo específico de explicar historias se puede mejorar habilidades socio-emocionales.

**Palabras Clave:** Comprensión social, Teoría de la mente, Preescolar, Aproximación basada en la acción, Narrativas compartidas, Zona de desarrollo próximo.

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## Introduction

The aim of the present study was to improve the social understanding skills of preschool children. By social understanding we mean the skills that permit people to understand and infer our and others' mental states, such as intentions, desires, and emotions (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; 2006; Dunn, 1988). Therefore, we conducted an intervention to test a possible way to help kindergarten teachers to foster children's social understanding competences through a special picture-book telling.

The general area of research on social cognitive and emotional development has been described in many different ways, including: "children's theory of mind" (Doherty, 2009), "belief-desire reasoning" (Wellman & Wolley, 1990), "socio-cognitive understanding" (de Rosnay & Hughes, 2006), "mind-mindedness" (Meins, Fernyhough, Johnson, & Lidstone, 2006), "executive function" (Martínez & Henao, 2006) or "folk psychology" (Bruner, 1990; Malle, 2004). All those concepts refer to the sociocognitive ability or skill to understand others as intentional agents, that is, to interpret their minds and their behaviors in terms of mental states. One important milestone in the development of social understanding is the false belief comprehension, or the understanding that people's behaviors are guided by their beliefs of the reality, no matter if they are true or false (Harris, de Rosnay, & Pons, 2005). The meta-analysis conducted by Wellman, Cross, and Watson (2001) which reviewed 178 false belief studies showed that most children come to understand false beliefs between the ages of 3 and 5. Some paradigmatic tasks used to assess this ability are "the location change task" (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), "the unexpected content task" (Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekman, 1989) and "the desire-belief-emotion task" (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke, 1989). According to Doherty (2009) these tasks are relevant to study the ability to understand phenomena such as intentions, in general, and false beliefs, in particular.

The longitudinal research has shown that early social understanding skills are associated with more *connected conversation* between children and their friends, an interactive style which involves a smooth communication in which each speaker is tuned in to the other's intentions and interests, with more shared and more elaborate imaginative engagement between friends, more skill at resolving conflicts, and more

moral sensitivity (Dunn, Cutting, & Demetriou, 2000). Therefore, describing and explaining the factors that are involved in the development or acquisition of social understanding is an important task in order to design methods to foster those abilities.

According to a Vygotskian approach, all higher psychological processes are social and cultural in nature, and the social nature of human cognition emerges in the active and dynamic process of internalization of external sociocultural experiences by individuals in the process of socialization (Fernyhough, 2008; Tomasello, 1999; Vygotsky, 1978). Within the action-based approach (Bibok, Carpendale, & Lewis, 2008), social understanding is conceptualized as a social skill. Social skills are practical and person-directed abilities that children gradually develop in particular types of situations and social contexts. Through the participation in joint social interactions (such as social games or picture-book reading) children learn to differentiate, integrate and coordinate the different perspectives and to use mental verbs correctly. In this sense, social understanding is based on action and development as the child interacts with his or her social environment. Examining individual differences in social development shows that factors such as cooperative play with older siblings, participation in talk about feelings and thoughts, disputes between mothers and siblings, secure attachment, parental education and attitudes, are all related to advances in the understanding of beliefs (for reviews see Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; 2006; Hughes & Leekam, 2004).

In particular, several researches have concluded that language provides opportunities for the development of more complex forms of social skills. In the process of learning how to use words that pertain to practical skills, children begin to become reflectively aware of and conceptualize these skills (see Astington & Baird, 2005, for a compendium of works in this research line). Specifically, a recent meta-analysis suggests that children's language ability is related to false-belief understanding (Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007). The literature has emphasized two aspects especially involved in the children's language ability. The first one is to use of sentential complement sentences. The second one is to engage in discourse about inner mental terms.

According to de Villiers and Pyers' (2002) longitudinal study, the mastery of a specific aspect of syntax, namely sentential complements, is a precursor and a possible prerequisite for a successful false-belief performance. Experimental studies that used training methodology confirms this hypothesis: after 3 training sessions, 3-year-old children improved their false belief understanding in a condition in which sentential complements syntax was used. The group trained on sentential complement sentences not only acquired the linguistic knowledge fostered in the training, but they also increased significantly their scores on a range of theory of mind tasks (Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003).

Moreover, a wealth of research has now shown that engaging in discourse about inner states is linked to later success in the understanding of mind and emotion, no matter if this is assessed in terms of success in theory of mind tasks or through the observations of interactive behavior (Astington & Baird, 2005; Dunn *et al.*, 2000). In the Lohmann and Tomasello (2003) training study, children showed the highest improvement in a condition using both perspective-shifting discourse and sentential complement syntax, suggesting both perspective-shifting discourse about deceptive objects and the use of sentential complements play an important role in the ontogeny of false belief understanding.

Esteban, Sidera and Serrano (2008) have suggested that a special picture-book reading by kindergarten teacher and their preschool children's could foster social understanding. Specifically, kindergarten teachers could emphasize the use of sentential complements and the causal talk about inner mental states, for example, "Little Red Riding Hood thinks that her grandmother is happy because she will have a present". In fact, several studies showed that the mother's use of cognitive state verbs in picture-book reading fosters the development of children's understanding of the mind (Adrian, Clemente, & Villanueva, 2007; Bertsch, Houlihan, Lenz, & Patte, 2009; Plessow-Wolfson & Epstein, 2005; Symons, Peterson, Slaughter, Roche, Doyle, 2005). More concretely, Slaughter, Peterson and Mackintosh (2007) found that the performance in a social understanding task was significantly correlated with mothers' explanatory, causal, and contrastive talk about cognition and emotion, but not with mothers' simple mentions of cognition or talk about emotions.

The specific aim of this study was to evaluate the effects of helping kindergarten teachers to train children's social understanding using a picture-book reading technique. We expect that such an intervention will improve children's social understanding.

## Method

### *Participants*

The sample comprised 96 children (44 girls) from two Spanish schools (four groups of 24 children) in the Catalonia area. The children came from same socio-economic background (medium-high) and were all Catalan speakers. They were between 39- and 52 months-old ( $M = 45.63$ ;  $SD = 3.79$ ). From the sample, a total of 83 children had attended to nursery before, while 13 did not. The participants were divided in two groups: the intervention group and the control group. In each school, one class was the control group and the other class the intervention group. Apart from the sample, four children were excluded from the study because they didn't attend to one of the sessions.

### *Instruments*

In order to evaluate the social understanding in the pretest and posttest, we used three tasks. Furthermore, we summed and averaged the three measures in a sum of social understanding score (range 0-5). In this section we describe the three tasks and also the story used in the training.

1) *A version of the Location change false belief task* (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In this standard change-of-location false-belief task, an object is moved from one place to another while the story protagonist is off the scene. As the story unfolds, the child needs to keep track of what is in the absent character's mind when the object is moved from the first location to the second. Three questions were asked to the children: "*When Maria comes back, where will she first look for the ball (pretest) or chocolate (posttest)*" (Prediction question); "*Where is really the ball (pretest) or the chocolate (posttest) now?*" (Reality question); "*Where was the ball (pretest,) or the chocolate*

(*posttest*), *in the beginning?*” (Memory question). Children responding correctly to the three questions were given 1 point on this task.

2) *An adaptation of the unexpected content false belief task* (Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekman, 1989). The standard task uses a commonly recognized container, for example a crayon box or a chocolate box which the experimenter fills with an unexpected content, such as coins, pencils or straws. We used an egg box with coins inside in the pretest, and a Smarties® tube containing tiny stones instead of chocolates, in the posttest. The procedure is the following: First, we made sure that the child recognized the container and then asked about its content: *“What do you think there is inside the box?”* (Prediction question). Then, we opened the container and revealed its unexpected content to the child. After that, we replaced the content inside the container, closed it, and asked the child to remember his previous belief about the content of the box: *“When you first saw the box closed, what did you think there was inside it?”* (Previous false belief question). Next, a reality question was posed to make sure that the child remembered what was really inside the box (*“In reality, what is there inside the box?”*). Finally, a puppet called Flopi came into the scene, and the experimenter explained to the child that the puppet had never seen what was inside the box. Then, the experimenter asked: *“If we show to Flopi this box, closed like that, and we ask him what is there inside the box, what will Flopi say?”* (Other’s false belief question). A last control question was made to assure that the children knew that Flopi had never seen the content of the box (*“Has Flopi ever seen what is there inside the box?”*). The previous and other false belief questions were accounted 1 point each. Thus, the score range on this task was from 0 to 2.

3) *A version of the desire-belief-emotion task* (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke, 1989; Experiment 3). We adapted the original task, and only one story was told instead of four. The children were introduced to a toy animal, the bear Pelut, and they were said that they were going to listen to a story about Pelut. They were told that Pelut liked one kind of food (a candy in the pretest and macaroni in the posttest) but he disliked another food (a chickpea in the pretest and a lentil in the posttest). The pieces of food were shown to the toy Pelut as this explanation was given. After that, a closed box was shown to the toy, and the children were told: *“Now we are going to give some food to Pelut. The food is inside the box. Pelut doesn’t know what is there inside the*



*box, but she wants to know it*". Then, the children had to predict the animal's emotion according to their possible beliefs. So they were asked first how Pelut would feel if he thought that inside the box there was her preferred item and then if he thought that there was the non-preferred item ("*If Pelut thinks there is X inside the box, how will he feel, happy or sad?*"). After that, a final question was made, about the appreciation of the impact of the non-preferred item on the animal ("*Oh look, it's a chickpea / lentil! How does Pelut feel, happy or sad?*"). Children were awarded 1 point if they appropriately predicted the animal's emotion according to his beliefs. On the other hand, if they correctly appreciated the animal's actual emotion, they were given another point. Thus, children's score on this task ranged from 0 to 2.

4) *A version of the Little Red Riding Hood story tale* (see appendix for a transcription). The book was adapted with the intention to develop children's social understanding. This version involves a description of why the protagonist behaves in certain ways, and what are his feelings and cognitions, so the next elements were introduced in the story: a) the use of sentential complement syntax; b) the use of causal and contrastive talk about mental states (desires, beliefs and emotions); c) the use of questions for the children to interact with the teacher. On the other hand, some pictures were used to accompany the explanations.

### *Procedure*

The children were divided in two groups: the control group, without picture-book reading, and the intervention group, who heard a version of the Little Red Riding Hood story. Each group was formed by two school classes. The two kindergarten teachers from the intervention group were trained by the experimenters to explain the story tale to the children in the appropriate way. The other two kindergarten teachers (control group) did not receive any instructions for the training period.

Fourth adult experimenters conducted the pretest and posttest. Children were tested individually in a quiet room in their preschools. In the first session the three pretest tasks administrated lasted about 15 minutes for child. In the intervention group, after the pretest, the teachers explained the story tale to the whole class three times in two weeks. Each training session took about 15 minutes, and three days after the last

session, children were given a posttest which lasted about 15 minutes. Like in the pretest, children were tested individually.

## Results

In this section, we first show that the control and the intervention groups are similar in the following variables: age, sex and pretest false belief scores. Second, we study the correlation between the results on the false belief tasks and having attended to nursery school. Third, we compare children's pretest and posttest scores, and finally, we expose the correlations between the three false belief tasks.

### *Equivalence of groups*

The Mann-Whitney's U and Chi-Square tests were performed to analyze if there were differences between the two groups for the age, sex, and having attended to nursery school. Results revealed that there were no significant differences for age ( $Z = -.677, p = .498$ ), sex ( $\chi^2_1 = 1.96, p = .682$ ) or having attended to nursery school ( $\chi^2_1 = .80, p = .371$ ) between the intervention and the control groups.

Table 1. *Mean age (SD) and percentage of girls in each group.*

	Control	Intervention
Age in months	45,88 (3,879)	45,38 (3,734)
Girls*	43,75 %	47,92 %

\* Percentage of girls

Mann-Whitney's U test showed that the intervention and control groups have similar results in all the pretest tasks: location change task ( $Z = -.893, p = .372$ ), unexpected content task ( $Z = -.104, p = .917$ ), desire-belief-emotion task ( $Z = -.774, p = .439$ ), sum of social understanding pretest score ( $Z = -.941, p = .346$ ).

*Social understanding scores*

When we compared through the Mann-Whitney's U test the results on the pretest scores between the children who attended the nursery school before and children who didn't, we observed significant differences between the two groups on the location change and the desire-belief-emotion tasks, as well as in the sum of social understanding pretest score, though no differences were found for the unexpected content task. Thus, in general, children with prior education obtained better pretest scores than the other children (see Table 2).

Table 2. Mean scores (SD) on false belief pretest tasks as a function of prior education.

	Nursery school	No nursery school	Z	p
Unexpected content <sup>1</sup>	0.82 (.72)	0.46 (.52)	-1,639	,101
Location change <sup>2</sup>	0.34 (.48)	0 (0)	-2,475	,013*
Desire-belief-emotion <sup>1</sup>	1.65 (.65)	1.00 (.71)	-3,508	,000*
Sum of scores <sup>3</sup>	2.81 (1.42)	1.46 (.88)	-3,275	,001*

\*  $p < .05$

1: Range from 0 to 2

2: Range from 0 to 1

3: Range from 0 to 5

The differences between pretest and posttest scores in each group were tested by the Mann-Whitney's U test (see Table 3). The results show a significant improvement ( $p < .05$ ) from the pretest to the posttest in the Sum of social understanding score (which includes the three tests) in the intervention group, but not in the control group. Furthermore, this improvement is not affected by the age of the children, as showed by a Pearson correlation between the improvement in the Sum of social understanding score and the age. This correlation was made in both the control group ( $r = -.106$ ,  $p = .472$ ) and the intervention group ( $r = -.033$ ,  $p = .823$ ). Below we consider the results from the three tests separately (see Table 3):

In the location change task, we observed a significant improvement ( $p < .05$ ) from the pretest to the posttest in the intervention group, but not in the control group. Furthermore, looking at the mean scores of the unexpected content task and the desire-

belief-emotion task, we detected a higher improvement in the intervention group compared to the control group, though this increase does not reach significance.

Table 3. Mean scores (SD) in the pretest and posttest in each group.

	Group	Pretest M (SD)	Posttest M (SD)	Z	p
Unexpected content	Control	0.79 (.77)	0.77 (.75)	-1.198	.843
	Intervention	0.75 (.64)	0.94 (.73)	-1.400	.162
Location change	Control	0.33 (.48)	0.35 (.48)	-.577	.564
	Intervention	0.25 (.44)	0.46 (.50)	-2.132	.033*
Desire-belief-emotion	Control	1.63 (.64)	1.65 (.67)	-.250	.803
	Intervention	1.50 (.74)	1.67 (.66)	-1.161	.246
Sum of scores	Control	2.75 (1.55)	2.77 (1.42)	-.068	.946
	Intervention	2.50 (1.30)	3.06 (1.36)	-2.181	.029*

\*  $p < .05$

The improvements detected in the intervention group on the three false belief tasks are not affected by the age of the children. Pearson correlations between age and improvement on the false belief tasks are not significant in any task ( $p > .05$ ). Similarly, in relation to the gender of the participants, the Mann-Whitney's U test showed no differences between girls and boys in their improvement in any of the false belief tasks, neither for the intervention or the control groups.

On the other hand, we found a significant correlation ( $r = .286$ ;  $p = .005$ ) between the children who improved in the change of location task and the children who improved in the unexpected content task. Conversely, there was no correlation between the children who improved in the emotion-desire-belief task and the children who improved in the two false belief tasks (location change task:  $r = .131$ ,  $p = .202$ ; unexpected content task:  $r = .085$ ,  $p = .410$ ).

## Discussion and conclusions

According to the action based approach to the development of social understanding (Bibok, Carpendale, & Lewis, 2008, p. 166), “we know the world in terms of what we can do with it”. That is, the social understanding is viewed in terms of

social skills that develop within the child's interaction with others. These interactions are situations in which children and adults share their understanding of the world (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004). Cognition and emotion mental verbs can be added to such shared practices, and language, like the use of sentential complement syntax (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002), makes possible more complex forms of social understanding. In this sense, several scholars (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Fernyhough, 2008; Meins, 1997) have used the notion of "zone of proximal development" (Vygotsky, 1978) and the role played by the interpersonal interaction in order to elucidate the acquisition of social understanding skills. The zone of proximal development is the difference between what a learner can do without help and what he or she can do with help. In other words, children follows an adult's (in our case, kindergarten teachers) example and gradually develop the ability to do certain tasks without help or assistance. In this sense, the role of the education is to provide children with experiences situated in their zone of proximal development, thereby encouraging and advancing their individual learning. In this line, Wood, Bruner, & Ross (1976) proposed the metaphor of scaffolding. Scaffolding refers to the gradual withdrawal of adult control and support as a function of children's increasing mastery of a given task (Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976). It could be argued that in our study two kindergarten teachers have made a zone of proximal development or scaffolding in order to incorporate some social understanding skills (false belief and desire—belief-emotion understanding). There are various forms of evidence supporting this view of how the social understanding develops (Adrian, Clemente, & Villanueva, 2007; Carpendale & Lewis, 2006; de Rosnay & Hughes, 2006; Plessow-Wolfson & Epstein, 2005; Slaughter, Peterson, & Mackintosh, 2007). In the introduction we cited two training studies that demonstrate the possibility to train theory of mind (Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). The innovation brought by our study is that it confirms the possibility for the kindergarten teachers to foster one aspect of the social understanding, the false belief, in an ecological context, using a version of a popular story.

Before commenting on the effect of the intervention, we want to point out the fact that children who did not attend to nursery school obtained worse results on the pretest than children who did. This result highlights the importance of attending to nursery school in the social development of the children, since it permits the children to participate in interactional situations with their peers. The infants who do not attend to

nursery school may also interact with other infants, but these interactions are probably different, because in the nursery school infants are often fostered to engage in structured activities involving cooperation. However, we need to clarify that we asked the teachers if the children had ever attended to nursery school, but not during how long. Thus, our results don't let us to conclude about the effects of attending earlier or later to the nursery. Future studies could take this aspect into consideration.

The results obtained in the present research show that the children increased their Sum of social understanding score in a significant way only in the intervention group, which could suggest that it is possible to improve the social understanding of the preschoolers through a training program consisting in three picture-book reading sessions by a kindergarten teacher. This program was effective independently of the age or gender of the children. However, these results must be considered cautiously because the improvement does not occur significantly in all the tasks. The children in the intervention group experienced a significant improvement only in the location change task. Despite the correlation between this task and the unexpected content task, the children did not improve significantly in the unexpected content task. Besides, they do not improve either in the emotion-desire-belief task. As a consequence, we cannot assert that the intervention had a general effect on false belief understanding of the children. Answering why children in the intervention group improved significantly only in one of the tasks remains uncertain. In our opinion, it is possibly related to the structure and content of the tale: different stories could have a different influence on the children depending on the emotions, desires, intentions and beliefs of their protagonists and how they are interrelated in the plot. It seems obvious that telling one concrete story tale to the children does not automatically develops all the aspects involved in the social understanding of the children. Thus, it might be needed to explain different story tales to really provoke important changes in the different aspects of the children's social understanding. On the other hand, in line with the theory of mind scale developed by Wellman & Liu (2004), which covers a range of different developmental attainments, it would be necessary to increase the range of social understanding tasks to maximize the evaluation of the social understanding concept. According to this broader concept of the social understanding, it would be possible to evaluate the possible long-term effects of an intervention using story telling, and confirm if the improvement observed in the location change task is generalized over time to other false belief tasks.

In sum, we can conclude that incorporating in the preschool classrooms story tales which use sentential complements syntax, causal and contrastive talk about mental states, and questions for the children to interact with the teacher, can be used to develop their false belief understanding, which is an important part of the social understanding of the children. Future research should study separately the impact of these linguistic and communicative factors in the children's understanding of the stories. In this study we controlled the age, sex, and previous children's performance on social understanding tasks. However, other variables should be taken into account in future research, such as: having older siblings, the quality of the relationships among the family members, the children's receptive vocabulary, children's knowledge on sentential complement syntax and the teacher's interactional style.

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## Appendix

### Story of Little Red Riding Hood

(In italics appear the sentences where the teacher poses questions to the children about the story)

Today we are going to tell the story of Little Red Riding Hood (LRRH). In this story will appear some characters: the wolf, the mother and the grandmother of LRRH, the hunter and LRRH.

*“Do you know LRRH? Do you know why she is called LRRH?”*

One day, the mother of LRRH told her that she should bring a cake to her grandmother. LRRH thought that it was a very good idea, because she loved her grandmother.

*“How does LRRH feel, happy or sad?”*

Very well, LRRH was happy because she loved her grandmother very much. But before leaving home, the mother of LRRH told her that she shouldn't take too long, and that she should not talk to strangers in the forest.

In her way to her grandmother's home, LRRH stopped together some little flowers. Suddenly, as she was gathering the flowers, she met with a wolf and LRRH got scared.

*“Is LRRH afraid? Why?”*

Very well, she is afraid because she did not know the wolf.

- Where are you going? – asked the wolf, with his husky voice.
- To my grandmother's – said LRRH.

Then, the wolf fooled LRRH and told her:

- This is the short path to your grandmother's home.

LRRH believed him and she left very happy, thinking that she took the shortest path to arrive to her grandmother's. But, it was really the longest one, and it was the wolf who took the shortest path.

The wolf arrived first to LRRH grandmother's home, and when he got in, he said to the grandmother:

- I will eat you!

*“How does grandmother feel? Is she scared?”*

Very well, grandmother was scared because she thought that the wolf would eat her. Then the wolf opened her big mouth and ate the grandmother up in a moment.

The wolf put on the grandmother's pajama to make LRRH believe that he was her grandmother, and he got into bed. In the meanwhile, LRRH arrived to her grandmother's.

*"How does LRRH feels before entering the house? Does LRRH know that there is the wolf inside the house?"*

Very well, LRRH was happy because she thought that her grandmother was waiting her. So LRRH got into the house, moved towards the bed, and noticed that her grandmother was very changed:

- Grandmother, what big ears you have!
- All the better to hear with, my child – said the wolf.
- Grandmother, what big eyes you have!
- All the better to see with, my child – said the wolf.
- Grandmother, what big teeth you have got!
- All the better to eat you up with!

After that, the wolf fell upon LRRH, and she saw that it was not her grandmother, it was the wolf disguised.

*"How does LRRH feel? Is she afraid?"*

Very well, LRRH is afraid because the wolf wanted to eat her. But suddenly, a hunter arrived very angry and opened the wolf's belly, and the grandmother escaped.

*"How does LRRH feel, happy or sad?"*

Very well, she is very happy because the hunter saved her grandmother. After, LRRH gave the cake to her grandmother.

*"How does the grandmother feels?"*

Very well, the grandmother feels happy because she likes cakes. Finally, the grandmother, the hunter and LRRH ate all the cake up.